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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
John Thomas Rainey appeals, pro se, from the judgment entered upon 
the district court's orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After Rainey pied guilty to sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or 
seventeen years of age, the district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with 
25 years fixed. State v. Rainey. Docket No. 35774, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 557, p.1 (Idaho App., July 22, 2010). The conviction and sentence were 
affirmed on appeal. ~ at 1-6. 
Rainey filed a timely pro se post-conviction petition alleging numerous 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims but, aside from his own conclusory 
affidavit, he did not support any of the claims with evidence. (R., pp.34-35, 44-
45, 72-73; #38151 R., pp.3-10.1) The district court denied his motion for the 
appointment of counsel and ultimately dismissed the petition. (R., pp.35, 45, 73; 
#38151 R., pp.22-58, 68-88.) Rainey appealed (R., pp.35, 45, 73; #38151 R., 
pp.89-92) but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which the Idaho 
1 The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion 
requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the clerk's record 
and transcripts prepared in Rainey's direct appeal from his underlying criminal 
conviction, State v. Rainey, S.Ct. Docket No. 35774, and in his appeal from the 
denial of his first post-conviction petition, Rainey v. State, S.Ct. Docket No. 
38151. 
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Supreme Court granted on June 1, 2011 (#38151 Order Granting Motion To 
Dismiss, entered June 1, 2011 ). 
On April 26, 2012, Rainey, again acting pro se, filed a successive petition 
for post-conviction relief, reasserting the ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
he alleged in his original petition and also alleging that bis sentence constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment and was imposed without regard for the 
presentence investigator's recommendations, and that the district court violated 
his Sixth Amendment rights by denying his request for the appointment of 
counsel in his first post-conviction action. (R., pp.4-14.) The district court denied 
Rainey's request for the appointment of counsel to pursue the successive 
petition, ruling that Rainey failed to present facts to raise even the possibility of a 
valid claim. (R., pp.34-41.) The state moved to dismiss the successive petition 
for the reasons set forth in the court's order denying Rainey's request for the 
appointment of counsel. (R., pp.42-43.) Thereafter, the court entered an order 
conditionally dismissing the successive petition but giving Rainey 20 days to file 
a response. (R., pp.44-51.) Rainey filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of his request for appointed counsel but did not specifically respond to the 
court's order of conditional dismissal. (R., pp.52-55.) The district court denied 
the motion for reconsideration and entered an order finally dismissing the 
successive petition. (R., pp.52, 72-79.) The court entered a judgment of 
dismissal on June 26, 2012 (R., pp.80-81), from which Rainey timely appealed 
(R., pp.82-85). 
2 
ISSUE 
Rainey's issue statement is set forth at pages 5-6 of his Appellant's brief 
and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Rainey failed to show error in the district court's orders summarily 
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition and denying his request for 
counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Rainey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Orders Denying His 
Request For Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Successive Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Rainey challenges the district court's orders denying his request for 
counsel and summarily dismissing his successive post-conviction petition. (See 
generally Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) With the exception of his claim that the 
district court erred by denying his requests for post-conviction counsel, Rainey 
has not identified any specific error by the district court and has not supported 
his appellate claims with any cogent argument or citation to legal authority; the 
claims are therefore waived and should not be considered by this Court on 
appeal. Alternatively, Rainey has failed to establish that the district court erred in 
denying his request for counsel and summarily dismissing his successive 
petition. 
B. This Court Should Decline To Consider Those Appellate Claims That Are 
Unsupported By Either Argument Or Authority 
"When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). It is also well settled that the appellate 
court will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been 
assigned and will not otherwise search the record for errors. State v. Hoisington, 
104 Idaho 153,159,657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983). 
4 
On appeal, Rainey has reiterated the claims in his successive post-
conviction petition but, with the exception of his claim that the district court erred 
by declining to appoint post-conviction counsel, he has not identified any specific 
error by the district court, has offered virtually no argument and has cited no 
legal authority. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-14) Given the lack of any 
meaningful argument and the complete absence of any citation to authority, this 
Court should decline to consider the merits of Rainey's unsupported claims. 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Rainey's Request For Counsel And 
Dismissed His Successive Petition Because The Allegations In The 
Petition Did Not Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Rainey's appellate claims, he 
has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's orders denying his 
request for counsel and summarily dismissing his successive petition because, 
as the district court correctly concluded, the allegations in the successive petition 
failed to raise even the possibility of a valid claim, much less present an issue of 
material fact entitling Rainey to an evidentiary hearing.2 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
2 A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present 
evidence sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be 
granted. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03 
(2007). Because this is a higher burden than demonstrating the possibility of a 
valid claim necessitating the appointment of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 
22, 24,218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339,345,223 
P.3d 281, 287 (Ct. App. 2009), the state will focus on the "possibility of a valid 
claim" standard on the assumption that if Rainey did not show entitlement to 
counsel the dismissal of his claims is proper, but that if he did show entitlement 
to counsel then dismissal without the opportunity of counsel to appear was error. 
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appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 
Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot 
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 
140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion 
for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
6 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 
1 02 P. 3d at 1111. 
In denying Rainey's request for counsel and dismissing his successive 
post-conviction petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated all of Rainey's 
claims and supporting evidence and correctly determined, based upon the 
applicable legal standards and its review of the underlying criminal and initial 
post-conviction records, that Rainey failed to set forth adequate facts to raise 
even the possibility of a valid claim, much less present a genuine issue of 
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of the claims in his 
successive petition. (See R., pp.34-41, 44-51, 72-79.) The state adopts as its 
argument on appeal the district court's analyses, as set forth in its May 9, 2012 
Order Denying Appointment Of Counsel, its May 22, 2012 Order Conditionally 
Dismissing Successive Petition, and its June 26, 2012 Order Dismissing 
Successive Petition. For this Court's convenience, copies of the district court's 
orders are appended to this brief. (See Appendices A - C.) 
With the exception of his claim that the district court erred in denying his 
requests for post-conviction counsel, Rainey does not specifically challenge any 
of the court's findings or legal conclusions. (See generally Appellant's brief.) As 
to the denial of counsel claim, Rainey relies on Martinez v. Ryan, _ U.S. _, 
132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), for the proposition that the district court, having denied 
Rainey's request for counsel in his first post-conviction proceeding, was required 
to appoint counsel in the successive post-conviction proceeding, apparently 
7 
without regard for the potential viability, or lack thereof, of any of the claims 
raised in the successive petition. (See Appellant's brief, pp.2-3, 10-11.) 
Rainey's reliance on Martinez for this proposition is wholly misplaced. In 
Martinez, the Supreme Court held, "Where, under state law, claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral 
proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing 
a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 
ineffective." 132 S.Ct. at 1320 (emphasis added). This is an equitable principle 
that applies a "narrow exception" to the "unqualified statement" in Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991 ), ''That an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence 
in a post-conviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural 
default" in a federal habeas proceeding; it does not provide a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 
1315. Rainey has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's 
orders denying counsel and dismissing his successive post-conviction petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
court's orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing Rainey's successive 
post-conviction petition. 
DATED this ih day of January 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ih day of January 2013, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
John Thomas Rainey 
IDOC #90457 
I.C.C., Q10C 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
LAF/pm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI~~y 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN THOMAS RAINEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699 
ORDER DENYING 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and 
disregarded the presentence investigator's recommendations. He also complains that in his appeal 
of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing counsel on appeal 
from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further he again contends that 
his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and 
pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to 
participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with 
him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his 
"somnambulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his attorney forced him to answer a 
questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised him a certain sentence. Like 
before, he did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or evidence. 
19 Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his original Petition some 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
simply repackaged. 
In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that 
statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against 
him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his 
attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney 
failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed 
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to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other 
affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his 
factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public 
expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the 
Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6, 
2011. 
The Court takes judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on 
July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation. The Court also takes judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707. 
Once again, in this Successive Petition, the record demonstrates that he was clearly 
informed by his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to remain silent and, 
moreover, he acknowledged in the record that he had been informed. In addition, as the Court 
found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the 
documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court again finds Rainey is not entitled to 
appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor, 
he fails to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The Court 
finds that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition are frivolous. By this decision, the 
Court is providing Rainey sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable him to 
provide additional facts, if they exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous claim. 
ANALYSIS 
Rainey's request for appointment of counsel for this Successive Petition is governed by 
LC. § 19-4904. 1 In an action for post-conviction relief, applicants do not have a constitutional right 
to counsel. Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007). A petitioner is not 
entitled to appointment of counsel at public expense if he fails to allege facts that raise the 
possibility of a valid claim. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009); I.C. § 19-
2 4 1 I.C. § 19-4904. If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, 
printing, witness fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may 
2 5 be made available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on 
order of the district court, by the county in which the application is filed. 
26 
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4904. In making that determination, the Court takes all inferences in the petitioner's favor. Id. at 
792, 102 P.3d at 1111; Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001). If the Court 
den'ies the motion for appointment of counsel, the Court must also provide the petitioner with 
sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable him to provide additional facts, if they 
exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous claim. Id.; Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
653-54, 152 P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007). 
The petitioner must first establish need. See LC. § I 9-854(b ). The Court finds that Rainey 
has met the requirement. However, his claims in his Successive Petition are frivolous and he is not 
entitled to relief. 
Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. § 19A9082 "where the 
petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks 
relief, or offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original, 
supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957 
( 1981) ( emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P .2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address 
collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon 
other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. 
App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the 
second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but 
substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743 
P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A 
successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief 
were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908. 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 P.3d 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006). 
2 J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the 
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application." 
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The Court, therefore, must determine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in 
the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these 
"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's 
sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this 
Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually 
disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-
conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is 
appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990). 
A. The challenge to his sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief 
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any 
event. 
Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's 
sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court 
is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a 
petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief 
if the sentence is othernise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. 
App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho 
886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987); 
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding 
under I. C. § 19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal 
sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the 
trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 352, 796 P.2d at 1025. 
Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an 
appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. § 19-4901 (b ). 
In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea 
agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and 
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that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim. 
"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the 
petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 
148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 80 l P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal 
issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 
Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 
703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the 
victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an 
essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of 
law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v.State,118 Idaho 865, 
869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
B. Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does 
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition. 
On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney 
failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report 
could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further 
contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended 
that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after 
being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or 
evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record. 
The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about 
his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological 
evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made 
could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element 
of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary 
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dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any 
evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d 
515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 
not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he 
must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed 
Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-
conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert 
witnesses, he "must assertfacts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and 
should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had 
been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,793,948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(em.phasis added)). In fact, 
the Court informed him of this when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its 
Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 2010. In his response, he simply 
reargued his case and provided no evidence to support this claim. 
In his Successive Petition he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a 
Successive Petition to simply reargue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his 
claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his 
first Petition. 
C. Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his 
original Post-Conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable. 
Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue 
on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he 
complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for 
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partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with 
the Court's order. 
When ]egal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been 
raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in 
a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P .2d 678, 680 (1988); 
State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey 
related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying 
counsel are barred or have no factual basis. 
Therefore, based on the documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court finds 
Rainey is not entitled to appointment of counsel at public expense in this Successive Petition 
because, taking every inference in his favor, he failed to allege facts that raised the possibility of a 
valid claim cognizable as a successive petition for post-conviction before this Court. 
Therefore, the Court denies his Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 8th day of May 2012. 
Cheri C~, ae 
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5 JOHN THOMAS RAINEY, 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699 
ORDER 
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING 
SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and the 
Court disregarded the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendations. He also complains 
that in his appeal of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing 
counsel on appeal from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further, he 
again contends that his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his 
psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a 
constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in 
on both examinations with him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an 
expert that could evaluate his "somnapi.bulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his 
attorney forced him to answer a questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised 
him a certain sentence. Like before, he did not support any of these statements with any other 
affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his 
original Petition - some simply repackaged. 
In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that 
statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against 
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him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his 
attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney 
failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed 
to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other 
affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his 
factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public 
expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the 
Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6, 
201 l. 
The Court took judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on 
July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation. The Court also took judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707. 
Once again, in this Successive Petition, contrary to his contention, the record demonstrates 
that he was clearly informed by both his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to 
remain silent. Moreover, he acknowledged in the record he had been informed. In addition, as the 
Court found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the 
documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court found Rainey was not entitled to 
appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor, 
he failed to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The 
Court found that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition are frivolous. Therefore, the 
Court denied his Motion for Attorney on May 7, 2012. 
Having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable to 
Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to successive post-conviction 
relief. LC. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its 
intention to dismiss Rainey's Successive Petition. 
Rainey and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 
days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Successive 
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Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue. 
ANALYSIS 
Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. § 19-4908 1 "where the 
petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks 
relief, or offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original, 
supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957 
(1981) (emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,798,992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address 
collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon 
other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. 
App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the 
second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but 
substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743 
P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A 
successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief 
were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908. 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 P.3d 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The Court, therefore, must determine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in 
the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these 
"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's 
sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this 
Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually 
disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-
conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is 
1 J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the 
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application." 
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appropriate. McKay y. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990). 
A. The challenge to bis sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief 
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any 
event. 
Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's 
sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court 
is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a 
petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief 
if the sentence is otherwise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. 
App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho 
886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987); 
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding 
under LC. § 19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal 
sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the 
trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 352, 796 P.2d at 1025. 
Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an 
appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. § l 9-4901(b). 
In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea 
agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and 
that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim. 
"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the 
petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 
148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal 
issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of 
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res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 
Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 
703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the 
victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an 
essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of 
law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 PJd 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 
869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
B. Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does 
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition. 
On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney 
failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report 
could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further 
contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended 
that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after 
being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or 
evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record. 
The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about 
his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological 
evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made 
could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element 
of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary 
dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. 
State. 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (l 990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any 
evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d 
515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 
not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he 
must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed 
Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-
conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert 
witnesses, he "must assert facts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and 
should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had 
been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (l 997)(emphasis added)). In fact, 
the Court informed him when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 20 I 0. In his response, he simply re-argued 
his case and provided no evidence to support this claim. 
In his Successive Petition, he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a 
Successive Petition to simply re-argue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his 
claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his 
first Petition. 
C. Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his 
original post-conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable. 
Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue 
on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he 
complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for 
partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with 
the Court's order. 
When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been 
raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res Judicata from raising them again in 
a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,210, 766 P.2d 678,680 (1988); 
State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey 
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related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying 
counsel are barred or have no factual basis. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light 
most favorable to Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to file this 
Successive Petition and is not entitled to post-conviction relief. I.C. §§ 19-4906(2), 19-4908. The 
Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose would be served by any 
further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its intention to dismiss 
Rainey's Successive Petition. 
Rainey and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 
days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Successive 
Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 22nd day of May 2012. 
Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge 
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JUN 2 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By LUCILLE DANSEREAU 
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR1ert5'f 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN THOMAS RAINEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699 
ORDER DISMISSING 
SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and the 
Court disregarded the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendations. He also complains 
that in his appeal of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing 
counsel on appeal from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further, he 
again contends that his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his 
psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a 
constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in 
on both examinations with him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an 
expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his 
attorney forced him to answer a questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised 
him a certain sentence. Like before, he did not support any of these statements with any other 
affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his 
original Petition - some simply repackaged. 
In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that 
statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against 
him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his 
attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney 
failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed 
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to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other 
affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his 
factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public 
expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the 
Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6, 
2011. 
The Court took judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on 
July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation. The Court also took judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707. 
Once again, in this Successive Petition, contrary to his contention, the record demonstrates 
that he was clearly informed by both his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to 
remain silent. Moreover, he acknowledged in the record he had been informed. In addition, as the 
Court found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the 
documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court found Rainey was not entitled to 
appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor, 
he failed to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The 
Court found that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition were frivolous, and therefore, 
the Court denied his Motion for Attorney on May 7, 2012. 
Having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable to 
Rainey, the Court again finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to successive 
post-conviction relief. LC. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material 
fact and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, having previously 
given twenty (20) days' notice of its intent to dismiss his Successive Petition, and having received 
no additional information, the Court dismisses his Successive Petition. 
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ANALYSIS 
Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. § 19-49081 "where the 
petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks 
relief, QI offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original, 
supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957 
( 1981) ( emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. 
App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address 
collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon 
other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. 
App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the 
second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but 
substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743 
P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A 
successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief 
were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908. 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 PJd 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The Court, therefore, must detennine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in 
the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these 
"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's 
sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this 
Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually 
disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-
conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is 
appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
1 J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the 
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, 
or amended application." 
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(1990). 
A. The challenge to his sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief 
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any 
event. 
Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's 
sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court 
is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a 
petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief 
if the sentence is otherwise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. 
App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho 
886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987); 
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding 
under LC. § 19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal 
sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the 
trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 3 52, 796 P .2d at 1025. 
Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an 
appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. §19-490l(b). 
In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea 
agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and 
that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim. 
"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the 
petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 
148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal 
issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 
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Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 
703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the 
victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an 
essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of 
law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 
869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
B. Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does 
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition. 
On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging 
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney 
failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report 
could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further 
contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended 
that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after 
being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or 
evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record. 
The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about 
his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological 
evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made 
could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element 
of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary 
dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any 
evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d 
515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 
not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he 
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must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed 
Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-
conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P .2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert 
witnesses, he "must assert facts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and 
should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had 
been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(emphasis added)). In fact, 
the Court informed him when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 2010. In his response, he simply reargued 
his case and provided no evidence to support this claim. 
In his Successive Petition he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a 
Successive Petition to simply reargue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his 
claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his 
first Petition. 
C. Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his 
original Post-Conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable. 
Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue 
on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he 
complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for 
partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with 
the Court's order. 
When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been 
raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in 
a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); 
State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey 
related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying 
counsel are barred or have no factual basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light 
most favorable to Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to file this 
Successive Petition and is not entitled to post-conviction relief. I.C. §§ 19-4906(2), 19-4908. The 
Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose would be served by any 
further proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Rainey's Successive Petition. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 26th day of June 2012. 
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, does hereby certify that on o#~une 
2012 I mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause 
in envelopes addressed as follows: 
JOHN THOMAS RAINEY 
IDOC NO. 90457 
I.S.C.I. 140-9A 
P.O. BOX 14 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-0014 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JEAN FISHER 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Date: /dZ1t/;;;., ByA~/41/~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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